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DISCHARGE OF PERSONAL LIABILITY ON
MORTGAGE DEBTS IN NEW YORI'*
By MILTON R. FRIEDMAN t
DISCHARGE of personal liability on mortgage debts in New York can
be accomplished simply and effectively by satisfaction of the mortgage,
delivery of a covenant not to sue, or any other adequate release.' But
mortgages are not paid and discharged with the same frequency with
which titles change by conveyance or death. As a result, problems of dis-
charge generally arise when the mortgagor is no longer owner of the
mortgaged premises and when the mortgagor has had reason to believe
or expects that his mortgage obligations would be met by others.
This article will discuss discharge of mortgage liability by events sub-
sequent to conveyance by the mortgagor, rights of the mortgagor against
subsequent owners of the land, and rights of the mortgagor against the
holder of the mortgage. Inasmuch as the status of any obligor on the
mortgage, with respect to subsequent owners, is similar to that of the
mortgagor,2 it will be convenient to use the term "mortgagor" at times
without reference to whether the liability in question wa created at the
inception of the mortgage or flhereafter.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Payment of interest or part of the principal prevents the Statute of
Limitations from running against a debt or revives a debt barred by the
statute. Such payment is deemed to import an acknowledgment of the
debt and a new promise to pay the residue dating from the time of pay-
ment. To be within the statute, however, case law requires that the pay-
ment be made by the party to be charged or somebody so authorized on
his behalf.
Although there is some conflict, the New York rule is clear. One joint
debtor cannot bind another by payment; a principal cannot bind a surct;
* This Article completes the subject discussed by the writer in Creation and Effect of
Personal Liability on Mortgage Debts it; New York (1940) 50 YA._ L J. 224 and The
Enforcemeant of Personal Liability on Mortgage Debts in N.e, York (1942) 51 Y,%= L J.
382.
" Member of the New York and Connecticut Bars.
1. See Schenectady Savings Bank v. Ashton, 205 App. Div. 731, 78, 200 N. Y.
Supp. 245, 247 (3d Dep't 1923).
2. There is no logical reason for distinguishing between a mortgagor and a per-
son subsequently assuming. The two have been similarly treated, without question, in
many of the cases cited in this article. Typical examples are: Kress v. Central Trust Co.,
246 App. Div. 76, 283 N. Y. Supp. 467 (4th Dep't 1935), offtd, 272 X. Y. 69, 5 X. E.
(2d) 365 (1936); Albany Exchange Savings Bank v. Winne, 168 Misc. 853, 6 N. Y. S.
(2d) 699 (Sup. Ct 1938).
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a surety, a principal; an assignee of an insolvent debtor, his assignor; or
an executor or administrator, the estate.3 And payments made on account
of a mortgage debt by a grantee of mortgaged premises are deemed to
be made by the grantee solely for his own protection and not as agent for
or to bind the mortgagor-grantor. Consequently, when a mortgagor con-
veys the mortgaged premises, the Statute of Limitations begins running
against his liability immediately upon the maturity of the debt, despite
receipt from the owner by the mortgagee of all payments to which he is
entitled.4
The relevant Statute of Limitations affecting mortgage liability has
heretofore depended on the manner in which the liability was created,
whether by the execution of a mortgage bond, the acceptance of a deed
containing an assumption of the mortgage or by parol.3 But this prob-
lem is disappearing in New York by statutory changes reducing the Stat-
ute of Limitations on mortgage debts and other sealed instruments to six
years, the same period as that applicable to simple contracts.0
3. See People's Trust Co. v. O'Neil, 273 N. Y. 312, 7 N. E. (2d) 244 (1937);
Harper v. Fairley, 53 N. Y. 442 (1873) ; Granirer, The Sale of Pledged Collateral, Part
Payment and Other Transactions as Affecting the Statute of Limitations, N. Y. L. J.,
Aug. 25, 1938, p. 476, col. 1, Aug. 26, 1938, p. 486, col. 1; Payment On Account by Third
Person as Affecting the Statute of Limitations, N. Y. L. J., Jan. 24, 1938, p. 372, col. 1.
4. See Brooklyn Savings Bank v. The Joseph Wechsler Estate, 259 N. Y. 9, 180
N. E. 752 (1932).
5. While negotiable instruments are commonly used in many jurisdictions to mani-
fest a mortgagor's liability, the obligation is usually created in New York by a mortgage
bond and repeated by a covenant in the mortgage. See Friedman, The Creation and Effecl
of Personal Liability on Mortgage Debts in New York (1940) 50 YALE L. J. 224, 225.
In this event the Statute of Limitations affecting specialties is applicable. But this rule
does not necessarily obtain with respect to mortgage liability assumed by a subsequent
owner of the premises. Such liability may be created by acceptance of a deed including
an assumption, though unsigned by the grantee, by agreement between the subsequent
owner and the mortgagee or by parol. Id. at 226. But by statute, effective April 6, 1938,
no assumption by deed is valid unless the assumption is executed and acknowledged by
the grantee. See N. Y. Civ. PRAcr. AcT § 1083-c; Legislation (1938) 13 ST. JoHN's L.
REv. 215. The statute, however, refers only to a mortgage which "shall hereafter be
executed" and apparently does not govern assumptions, made subsequent to its enact-
ment, of mortgages theretofore executed. Insofar, therefore, as mortgage debts are val-
idly assumed by parol, the Statute of Limitations affecting simple contracts is applicable.
A more serious problem is presented when the assumption is based upon a deed unsigned
by the grantee. The authorities, in general, are split as to whether such an obligation is
a specialty or a simple contract, see Note (1927) 51 A. L. R. 981; cases cited in A. L. R.
Blue Bk. of Supp. Dec. (1943) 446, but in New York a deed of this character is deemed
to be the deed of both parties and the grantee's assumption a specialty. See Bowen
v. Beck, 94 N. Y. 86 (1883) ; Futherer v. Agnew, 24 N. Y. S. (2d) 273 (Sup. Ct. 1941),
aff'd, 261 App. Div. 876, 25 N. Y. S. (2d) 207 (4th Dep't 1941).
6. See N. Y. Civ. Pa~c. Acr §§ 47, 47a.
DISCHARGE OF MORTG.IGE DEBTS
MODIFICATION OF IORTGAGE BY AGREEMENT BETWEEN MORTGAGEE
AND SUBSEQUENT OWNER
Effect of Conveyance by Mortgagor
To non-assuming grantee. As long as the mortgagor owns the prenises,
the relation between mortgagor and mortgagee is simple. The mortgagee
is a secured creditor with remedies on the debt and on the collateral. But
apart from this there is no occasion until a conveyance to draw a dis-
tinction between the mortgagor and the mortgaged premises. The con-
veyance is necessarily subject to the mortgage and passes only the "equity
in the property," that is, an interest in the premises over and above
the mortgage, whether the deed is silent on the mortgage or expressly
subject to it, and whether or not the grantee assumes the mortgage.
The mortgagee's remedy on the bond remains unaffected by the con-
veyance,7 and he may enforce payment of the debt against the mort-
gagor without foreclosure; in this respect the mortgagor remains a "prim-
ary" obligor. But since the grantee has bought only the equity and pre-
sumably paid only for the equity,' he is not justified in holding the
property free and clear of the mortgage.' If, then, the mortgagor has
paid the debt on maturity, he is entitled to the land for repayment,"
being in effect entitled to some of the rights usually vested in a surety.
This is all that is meant by the oft-repeated statement that upon a con-
veyance the land becomes "primarily liable" for the debt." But if the
7. See Wagoner v. Brady, 221 App. Div. 405, 223 N. Y. Supp. 99 (3d Dep't 19217);
Rochester Savings Bank v. Stoeltzen & Tapper, 176 Misc. 140, 26 N. Y. S. (2d) 713 (Sup.
Ct. 1941) ; Albany Exch. Bank v. Winne, 168 Misc. 853, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 699 (Sup. Ct.
1938); Note (1926) 41 A. L. R. 317. For the mortgagee's choice of remedies and the
qualifications of their use generally, see Friedman, The Enforcement of Pcrsonal Liability
on Mortgage Debts in New York (1942) 51 YALE L. J. 382.
8. Where premises are conveyed subject to a mortgage, there is a presumption that
the amount of the mortgage has been deducted from the purchase price. Johnson v. Zinh-,
51 N. Y. 333, 337 (1873) ; 2 JONES, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) § 911; 2 Ponm.ov, Egun'y
JuEisPRUDExCE (4th ed. 1918) § 657; 3 id. § 1205.
9. See Rochester Savings Bank v. Stoeltzen & Tapper, 176 Misc. 140, 143-44, 26 N.
Y. S. (2d) 718, 721 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Cherry v. Monro, 2 Barb. Ch. 618 (N. Y. 1848);
2 Poa OY, op. cit. supra note 8, § 911; 3 id. § 1205.
10. See Howard v. Robbins, 170 N. Y. 498, 63 N. E. 630 (1902) ; Schenectady Sav-
ings Bank v. Ashton, 205 App. Div. 781, 200 N. Y. Supp. 245 (3d Dep't 1923).
11. The statement that a conveyance of the mortgaged premises makes the land the
primary fund for the debt appears in most of the relevant cases and literature. The rule
is inapplicable where the circumstances are such as to impute an intention to the mort-
gagor to remain primarily liable, as where the purchase price appro,imates the value of
the fee unencumbered. And this despite the use of a quit-claim deed. See Wadsworth v.
Lyon, 93 N. Y. 201 (1883). See also Wilbur v. Warren, 104 N. Y. 192, 195, 10 N. E.
263, 264 (1887). On the other hand the rule does apply where both mortgagor and
grantee agree with the mortgagee to be liable. See Neukirch v. McHugh, 165 App. Div.
406, 410, 150 N. Y. Supp. 1032, 1036 (1st Dep't 1914). It does not give the grantee the
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mortgagee has foreclosed his mortgage and recovered a deficiency judg-
ment against the mortgagor, the mortgagor has no right over against
the land for reimbursement because foreclosure extinguishes all equity
in the premises subordinate to the mortgage and with it the mortgagor's
right over against the land. 2
To assuming grantee. If the grantee assumes the mortgage, the grantee
is, with respect to the mortgagor, primarily liable for the debt; and the
mortgagor, only secondarily so." If, in this event, the mortgagor is com-
pelled to pay the debt, he has two remedies to make himself whole, though
but one satisfaction :' a judgment for reimbursement against the assum-
ing grantee and his remedy against the land. If the mortgagee has fore-
closed and recovered a deficiency judgment which the mortgagor is com-
pelled to pay, the mortgagor may, though his right against the land is
extinguished, recover over for the amount of the deficiency judgment."
The relation between grantee and mortgagor in this situation is deemed
to be that of principal and surety and is fully treated as such.
Should the relationship be disregarded by the mortgagee, the mortgagor's
liability may be discharged by application of the general rule that a credi-
tor, knowing that his debtors are or have become principal and surety as
to each other, whatever their original form of liability, cannot prejudice
the rights of the surety without releasing the surety in whole or in part.10
benefit of any collateral security for the mortgage debt in the hands of the mortgagee,
Brewer v. Staples, 3 Sandf. Ch. 579 (N. Y. 1846) ; 2 JONES, op. cit. supra note 8, § 913.
The rule of primary liability is said to have arisen where the grantee did not assume
the mortgage, and in order to avoid unfairness to the mortgagor. See Rochester Sav-
ings Bank v. Stoeltzen & Tapper, 176 Misc. 140, 143, 26 N. Y. S. (2d) 718, 721 (Sup.
Ct. 1941). Yet another dictum indicates that even an unenforceable assumption will bring
it into effect. Howard v. Robbins, 170 N. Y. 498, 503, 63 N. E. 530, 531 (1902). These
dicta are misleading because the rule is applied regardless of personal assumption. Cf.
Calvo v. Davies, 73 N. Y. 211 (1"878); Murray v. Marshall, 94 N. Y. 611 (1884).
The rule is said to govern the relationship between the mortgagor and grantee without
effect on the mortgagee. This is but another way of saying that a conveyance does not
bar a mortgagee from recovering against the mortgagor on the bond regardless of any
assumption by the grantee. See Kmetz v. De Ronde, 231 N. Y. 641, 132 N. E. 921
(1921). Some cases state the land is "primarily liable" after a conveyance of the mort-
gaged premises to the mortgagee. This merely describes the limitations on the mortgagee's
right to enforce payment of the debt after possessing himself of the mortgaged fee. See
pp. 786, 787 infra.
12. See Comstock v. Drohan, 71 N. Y. 9, 13 (1877).
13. This applies to succeeding conveyances and if a succession of conveyances is
accompanied by a chain of assumptions the liability for the mortgage debt is cast upon
the grantees in the inverse order of assumption. See authorities cited in note 7 supra.
14. See McRae v. Pope, 311 Mass. 500, 42 N. E. (2d) 261 (1942); 4 WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1936) § 1219.
15. See p. 790 et seq. infra.
16. 4 WxLLISTON, op. cit. supra note 14, § 1258; STEARNS, SURErysuwr (4th ed.
1934) §§ 23, 90. Familiar examples are a retiring partner, Colgrove v. Tallman, 67 N. Y.
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MODIFICATION BY MORTGAGEE AND THE GRANTEE WHo ASSUMED
MORTGAGE BY AGREEMENT WITH MORTGAGOR
The first reported case in New York to consider the effect on a mni rt-
gagor's liability of an extension agreement made between the mortgagee
and a subsequent owner was Perkins v. Squire' 7 decided in 1873. The
mortgagee brought an action at law in General Term on the bond against
the mortgagor. The latter claimed that his conveyance to an assuming
grantee made him a surety and that he was released by virtue of an ex-
tension agreement made without his consent. The court noted the de-
fendant's failure to allege the duration of the extension and dismissed thc
defense as frivolous without fully appreciating its nature.' 8 Four years
later when the same point was made in Meyer v. Lathrop,'0 the court
reached the anamolous result 20 that the mortgagor was a surety with
respect to the assuming grantee but that this relationship was without
effect on the mortgagee's rights. These cases were overruled by the Court
of Appeals in Calvo v. Davies 21 where the suretyship relationship was
held to affect the mortgagee; and the mortgagor, as surety, was held com-
pletely discharged by the extension made between the creditor and princi-
pal. The court assumed that if the mortgagor had paid the debt at its origi-
nal maturity his right over against either the grantee or the land would
be stayed during the extension and concluded that the mortgagor was
affected by the modification made by the mortgagee and grantee warrant-
ing the release it decreed. The assumption that the mortgagor's rights
95 (1876), and a lessee who assigns his lease, Schieffelin v. Mocan Realty Corp., 2S3 N.
Y. 606, 28 N. E. (2d) 24 (1940); Crowley v. Gormley, 59 App. Div. 2:6, 69 N. Y.
Supp. 576 (2d Dep't 191); Notes (1932) 41 Y=lm L. J. 1239, (1935) 99 A. L R. 1233.
17. 1 Thomp. & C. 620 (N. Y. 1873).
18. The court seemed to assume that the extension agreement could be a defense
only if it was unexpired at the inception of the action. It noted the defendant's failure
to allege the duration of the agreement and therefore concluded there was no indicated
prematurity.
19. 10 Hun 66 (2d Dep't N. Y. 1877), aff'd on other grounds, 73 N. Y. 315 (1878).
20. There was a conceptual difficulty in holding an assuming grantee a principal
debtor of the mortgagee before the mortgagee was given a direct cause of action against
the former. See Union Mutual Ins. Co. v. Hanford, 143 U. S. 187, 190 (1892). Prior to
Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N. Y. 26S (1859), a mortgagee could not recover on the mortgage
bond against an assuming grantee but could recover a deficiency judgment on the theory
of "equitable subrogation" to the rights of the mortgagor-grantor against the assuming
grantee. For the distinction generally between the mortgagee's position under equitable
subrogation and as a third-party contract beneficiary, see Friedman, msipra note 5, at 224,
230 et seq.
It should be noted that the surety relationship between mortgagor and grantee is
predicated upon an agreement between the mortgagor and grantee (almost always af-
fected through assumption by deed) and that an assumption of the mortgage by agree-
ment between the grantee and the mortgagee leads to substantially different consequences.
See pp. 779, 791 infra.
21. 73 N. Y. 211 (1878).
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are necessarily bound by the agreement between mortgagee and grantee
is the logical basis of the decision. Although authority for this assump-
tion, either pro or con, is scant,2" Calvo v. Davies represents the majority
American view."
Inasmuch as the creation of the suretyship relationship results from
dealings between mortgagor and grantee, to which the mortgagee is gen-
erally not privy, it is clear that the mortgagee is not bound by the rela-
tionship under Calvo v. Davies unless he is cognizant of the grantee's
assumption 24 at the time he makes a subsequent agreement with the
grantee.2 5 The burden of proving this knowledge is on the mortgagor.2
Mere recordation of a deed to a grantee assuming the mortgage is not apt
to come to the mortgagee's attention, and it has accordingly been held
that recordation alone is not sufficient to charge a mortgagee with such
knowledge.21
The suretyship relationship created by the mortgagor's conveyance to
an assuming grantee continues after recovery of a money judgment
against the mortgagor, and any such judgment may be released by an act
which would have released the claim upon which it was founded. Thus,
when a mortgagee recovered judgment against both mortgagor and as-
suming grantee, release of the judgment against the latter was held to
release the former by operation of law.2
22. See p. 797 infra.
23. See Notes (1926) 41 A. L. R. 277, (1931) 72 A. L. R. 389, (1932) 81 A. L. R.
1016, (1938) 112 A. L. R. 1324; 41 C. J. 719; 37 AM. JuR. 357, § 1056 ct seq.
24. See 4 WILmsToN, op. cit. supra note 14, § 1220; cf. Dibble v. Richardson, 171
N. Y. 131, 63 N. E. 829 (1902); Grow v. Garlock, 97 N. Y. 81 (1884); Palmer v.
Purdy, 83 N. Y. 144 (1880).
25. See Union Mutual Ins. Co. v. Hanford, 143 U. S. 187, 191 (1892); White v.
Augello, 142 Misc. 233, 236-37, 254 N. Y. Supp. 228, 232 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
26. See White v. Augello, 142 Misc. 233, 254 N. Y. Supp. 228 (Sup. Ct. 1931) ; Star
Fire Ins. Co. v. Waddington, 18 N. Y. W'kly Dig. 307 (Sup. Ct. 1883); Fidelity Union
Trust Co. v. Prudent Investment Corp., 129 N. J. Eq. 255, 259, 19 A. (2d) 224, 227
(1941).
27. See White v. Augello, 142 Misc. 233, 254 N. Y. Supp. 228 (Sup. Ct. 1931), and
cases cited therein; Star Fire Ins. Co. v. Waddington, 18 N. Y. W'kly Dig. 307 (Sup. Ct.
1883); STEA s, op. cit. supra note 16, § 90. Contra: Tousey v. Barber, 132 Misc.
861, 231 N. Y. Supp. 133 (Sup. Ct. 1928), (1929) 42 ARBv. L. Rv. 583; Merrill v.
Reiners, 14 Misc. 583, 36 N. Y. Supp. 634 (Sup. Ct. 1895). The only purpose of re-
cordation is to notify subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers. Mead v. Bunn, 32 N. Y.
275, 278 (1865) ; 2 PomERoY, op. cit. supra note 8, § 657; 3 id. § 1226.
Where the mortgage is given by the mortgagor to secure another's debt the mort-
gagee is presumed to know of the principal-suretyship relation from the public records.
See Bank of Albion v. Burns, 46 N. Y. 170 (1871).
28. See Wagoner v. Brady, 221 App. Div. 405, 223 N. Y. Supp. 99 (3d Dep't 1927);
4 WILlSTON, op. cit. supra note 14, § 1254. See also In re Oster's ftstate, 8 N. Y. S.
(2d) 249, 255 (Surr. Ct. 1938), aff'd, 258 App. Div. 930, 16 N. Y. S. (2d) 612 (4th
Dep't 1939) ; Rosenfeld v. Levine, 249 App. Div. 142, 146, 291 N. Y. Supp. 474, 479 (1st
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Modification between Mortgagee and ANon-assuming Grantee
When a mortgagor's conveyance runs to a non-assuming grantee, as-
similation of the mortgagor and grantee to a surety-principal relation-
ship runs into conceptual difficulties. In Penfield v. Goodrich,21 an ac-
tion for foreclosure and a deficiency judgment, the mortgagor's defense
on the ground that he was released from persunal liability by virtue of
an extension agreement made between the mortgagee and the grantee was
unsuccessful. The court reasoned that the essence of suretyship is the
existence of a principal and that the mortgagor could not be both principal
and surety. Thus there was no suretyship relationship, and its absence
was not affected by the rule of "primary liability" of the land. Under
this rule, according to the court, the mortgagor is subrogated on payment
of the debt, not because he was a surety but because he has paid a del-t
charged upon the land of another and should, therefore, succeed to the
creditor's rights.
Penfield z,. Goodrich was overruled by the Court of Appeals in Muberray
v. Marshall,30 in which the mortgagor was released from the debt to the
extent of the value of the property at the time of the extension agree-
ment. The court stated that the grantee was not a debtor but that the land
was primarily liable to the extent of its value in exoneration of the mort-
gagor. The mortgagor had a right, as against the grantee, that the land
be first exhausted and this remedy could not be invaded with impunity.
The extension agreement took this right away for the time being and
placed a new, unagreed risk upon the mortgagor. In addition, the value
of the premises and the mortgagor's right might have decreased and the
debt increased. The mortgagee dealt with a grantee and, therefore, knew
of the conveyance. But the mortgagor was not wholly discharged; he
was a "quasi-surety" to the extent of the value of the land. The measure
of his injury was his right of subrogation, value of the land, and the ex-
tension released him to this extent. From then on, the risk of future de-
preciation of the land was on the mortgagee. Thus the mortgagor was
discharged only insofar as he was a "surety" and otherwise remained a
principal debtor.
Under Murray v. Marshall the mortgagor is liable only for the amount
by which the value of the premises falls short of equalling the debt.2t
Dep't 1936) ; Bondy v. Aronson & List Realties, 227 App. Div. 136, 140, 237 N. Y. Supp.
444, 448 (4th Dep't 1929). The rule was confused in Tousey v. Barber, 132 Misc. 851,
231 N. Y. Supp. 133 (Sup. Ct. 1928), criticised in (1929) 42 H.NRv. L. R z. 583, where
the mere recovery of a deficiency judgment against the mvrtgagor alone, in a forecl sure
action in which the grantee was joined, was viewed as releasing the mortgagor per se.
29. 10 Hun 41 (2d Dep't 1877); accord, Sheperd v. May. 115 U. S. 505 (1S5).
30. 94 N. Y. 611 (1884).
31. See Union Bank v. Rubinstein, 78 Alisc. 461, 138 N. Y. Supp. 644 1 Sup. Ct.
1912), aff'd, 160 App. Div. 919, 145 N. Y. Supp. 1 (ist Dep't 1914), 216 N. Y. 76t, 111
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If, therefore, the mortgagee's action is for foreclosure the proceeds of
the foreclosure sale are applied first to the debt on which the mortgagor
is liable.32
Like Calvo v. Davies, Murray v. Marshall represents the majority
American view. 3 The two cases involve parallel rules but have at times
been confused despite their difference in pleading, proof and the relief af-
forded.3 4 Inasmuch as the defense under Murray v. Marshall is an affirnia-
tive defense, in the nature of confession and avoidance, the burden of
proof thereunder is on the defendant and the value of the premises is to
be pleaded and proved by the mortgagor."
N. E. 1101 (1916). See also Matter of Piza, 5 App. Div. 181, 38 N. Y. Supp. 540 (1st
Dep't 1896).
32. See Silverstein v. Brown, 153 App. Div. 677, 138 N. Y. Supp. 848 (1st Dep't
1912). See also Irving Trust Co. v. Hutchinson Holding Co., 241 App. Div. 107, 108,
270 N. Y. Supp. 684, 686 (1st Dep't 1934) ; Katz v. Mendelsohn, 260 N. Y. 434, 445, 184
N. E. 45, 98 (1933) (dissenting opinion). But cf. Meigs v. Cody, 139 Misc. 94, 247 N. Y.
Supp. 467 (Sup. Ct. 1929), aff'd, 232 App. Div. 726, 247 N. Y. Supp. 893 (4th Dep't
1931) (grantee assuming specified items of mortgage debt liable for any deficiency up to
limit of liability assumed).
33. See Commercial Casualty Ins. Co. v. Roman, 269 N. Y. 451, 199 N. E, 658
(1936) ; Metzger v. Nova Realty Co., 214 N. Y. 26, 107 N. E. 1027 (1915) ; cases col-
lected in Stevens, Extension Agreements in the "Subject-To" Mortgage Situation (1941)
15 U. OF CiN. L. REv. 58, 58-60, and cases cited in note 23 sipra.
Where negotiable mortgage notes are used in place of bonds, there is, however, some
controversy. In this event the majority refuse to release a mortgagor where the mort-
gage is extended by agreement between mortgagee and a subsequent owner. The ma-
jority hold that NEGOTrABLE INSTRUMENTs LAW §§ 119, 120, 192, providing for release
of a secondary party, have no application to the maker, a primary party. The minority
rely on NEGOTIABLE INSTRUmENTS LAW § 196, providing that the law merchant governs
cases not otherwise covered by the Act. See the exhaustive discussion and collection of
cases in Mortgage Guarantee Co. v. Chotiner, 8 Cal. (2d) 110, 64 P. (2d) 138 (1936),
108 A. L. R. 1080, 1088 (1937), (1937) 10 So. CALIF. L. REV. 511'; Glenn, Purchasing Sub-
ject to Mortgage. Second Phase, Mortgagee's Rights Against Assuming Grantee (1942) 28
VA. L. REV. 445, 460-6f; Suretyship Releases in the Law of Mortgages (1937) 4 U. or
CHI. L. REv. 469, 475. But see Keeler v. Templeton, 164 Misc. 113, 298 N. Y. Supp. 193
(Sup. Ct. 1937) (construing California law).
. 34. In Meldola v. Furlong, 142 Misc. 562, 255 N. Y. Supp. 48 (Sup. Ct. 1932), an
action to foreclose and recover a deficiency judgment, the facts warranted a complete
release of the mortgagor under Calvo v. Davies. The case was decided, however, under
the rule of Murray v. Marshall and judgment given the mortgagee because of the mort-
gagor's failure to offer proof of the value of the property at the time of the extension.
35. See Feigenbaum v. Hiznay, 187 App. Div. 126, 175 N. Y. Supp. 223 (1st Dcp't
1919); Wiener v. Boehm, 126 App. Div. 703, 111 N. Y. Supp. 126 (1st Dep't 1908).
But see White v. Augello, 142 Misc. 233, 240, 254 N. Y. Supp. 228, 236 (Sup. Ct. 1931);
Meuser v. Kirschbaum, 84 Misc. 259, 262, 145 N. Y. Supp. 677, 679 (Sup. Ct. 1914).
[Vol. 52: 771
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MODIFICATION BY MORTGAGEE AND GRANTEE WHO SUBSEQUENTLY
ASSUMED BY AGREEMENT WIUTH MORTGAGEE
A third situation arises often enough to merit more extended con-
sideration than that found in the books. It involves a cunveyance by the
mortgagor to a non-assuming grantee who subsequently assumes the mort-
gage by virtue of an extension or other agreement with the mortgagee.
This is probably the most usual situation in the reported cases and seems
to have been the one in Murray v. Marshall, though the opinion hardly
noted it. When the point was expressly raised, the situation was held to
be within the rule of Murray z. Marshall on the ground that an assump-
tion of the mortgage, arising out of an agreement between grantee and
mortgagee, creates no privity between grantee and mortgagor on which
a suretyship relation may be predicated."
Contractual Prerequisites of Release
General. The rules of Calvo 'v. Davies and Murray v. M1farshall are,
with a few exceptions already noted, similarly applied. The nature of the
extension or modification agreement necessary to release the mortgagor,
the necessity of consideration, establishment of a valid agreement and the
like are the same whichever rule is applicable. Accordingly, the same
authorities concerning the contractual prerequisites of release of the mort-
gagor are used herein whether the release in question is entire under
Calvo v. Davies or pro tanto under Murray v. Marshall.
To release the mortgagor the agreement between the mortgagee and
grantee must contain all the elements of a valid and enforceable contract."
Since such an agreement constitutes an affirmative defense, the burden
of establishing it is on the mortgagor.3" If the agreement purports to
extend the mortgage, it must be of such a nature as to preclude the mort-
gagee from enforcing payment of the principal for the time being.39 An
36. See Feigenbaum v. Hiznay, 187 App. Div. 126, 175 N. Y. Supp. 223 (lst Dep't
1919) ; Matter of Piza, 5 App. Div. 181, 38 N. Y. Supp. 540 (1st Dep't 1896). Contra:
Barden v. Sworts, 112 Misc. 384, 183 N. Y. Supp. 184 (Sup. Ct. 1920); Merrill v.
Reiners, 14 Misc. 58 3, 36 N. Y. Supp. 634 (Sup. Ct. 1S95). See also .Meuser v. Kirsch-
baum, 84 Misc. 259, 262, 145 N. Y. Supp. 677, 679 (Sup. Ct. 1914) ; Lillie v. MeFarlin,
304 Ill. App. 27, 25 N. E. (2d) 896 (1940). Compare tes-t at pp. 775, 791.
37. See Egbert v. McGuire, 36 Misc. 245, 73 N. Y. Supp. 302 (Sup. Ct. 1901). See
also Murray v. Marshall, 94 N. Y. 611, 616 (1884).
38. See Neuldrch v. McHugh, 165 App. Div. 406, 150 N. Y. Supp. 1032 (lst Dep't
1914) ; Wiener v. Boehm, 126 App. Div. 703, 111 N. Y. Supp. 126 (1st Dep't 1903).
39. See Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Veher, 30 Misc. 250, 63 N. Y. Supp. 224
(Sup. Ct. 1900) ; Jester v. Sterling, 25 Hun 344 (N. Y. 18S1). See also Becker v. Faber,
280 N. Y. 146, 150-51, 19 N. E. (2d) 997, 999-1000, 121 A. L. IL 1010, 1014 (1939); Na-
tional Citizens' Bank v. Toplitz, 178 N. Y. 464, 466-67, 71 N. E. 1, 2 (1904) ; cf. Moser v.
Walker, 23 App. Div. 91, 48 N. Y. Supp. 341 (2d Dep't 1897).
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agreement that a mortgage would remain "open" if specified amortizations
were made was held to be no extension on the ground that the mortgagee
never relinquished his right to call the mortgage,40 but the same court
subsequently held the contrary on facts difficult to distinguish.4 A mort-
gagor has been released by reason of an extension agreement made prior
to the original maturity of the debt though a supervening foreclosure
prevented the inception of the extension.4 ' And the same result followed
where the agreement was made after the debt had become due by its
terms.
43
Necessity of Consideration. The necessity of consideration in extension
agreements has been a troublesome factor in New York, and statutory
changes have recently sought to alleviate the difficulties. New York courts
have firmly held that an agreement to extend the time of payment of a
debt for a specified period upon the same terms as the initial obligation
gives the creditor no more than that already owed him, is insufficient
consideration and cannot prevent enforcement of the original claim."
40. See Excelsior Savings Bank v. Cohen, 176 App. Div. 740, 163 N. Y. Supp. 1017,
aft'd, 228 N. Y. 570, 127 N. E. 912 (1920) ; cf. Merritt v. Youmans, 21 App. Div. 256,
47 N. Y. Supp. 664 (2d Dep't 1897).
41. See City Bank Farmers' Trust Co. v. Slowmach Realty Corp., 238 App. Div. 524,
264 N. Y. Supp. 786 (1st Dep't 1933), aff'd, 263 N. Y. 544, 189 N. E. 690 (1933).
42. See Barden v. Sworts, 112 Misc. 384, 183 N. Y. Supp. 184 (Sup. Ct. 1920);
Merrill v. Reiners, 14 Misc. 583, 36 N. Y. Supp. 634 (Sup. Ct. 1895) ; SPENCER, SURL'ry-
SHIP (1913) §225.
43. See Syracuse Trust Co. v. First Trust & Deposit Co., 141 Misc. 603, 252 N. Y.
Supp. 850 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
44. See Olmstead v. Latimer, 158 N. Y. 313, 53 N. E. 5 (1899); Title Guarantee
& Trust Co. v. Weiher, 30 Misc. 250, 63 N. Y. Supp. 224 (Sup. Ct. 1900) ; Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. Stimpson, 28 App. Div. 544, 51 N. Y. Supp. 226 (2d Dep't 1898) ; Moser
v. Walker, 23 App. Div. 91, 48 N. Y. Supp. 341 (2d Dep't 1897).
The New York rule that extension agreements, without more, were unenforceable
is fortunately followed by but a small majority of jurisdictions. See Note (1938) 48
YALE L. J. 149, 153, n. 21. An obligation for a fixed period is subject to neither call
nor payment before maturity. 3 TIFFANY, REAL PRoPErY (2d ed. 1920) 2588, § 640.
See Quackenbush v. Mapes, 123 App. Div. 242, 245-46, 107 N. Y. Supp. 1047, 1050
(1st Dep't 1908). The creditor receives an obvious advantage in the promise that his
funds will produce income for the full period agreed on. The advantage is mutual in
avoiding for both parties the dislocation, loss and expense attendant on compulsory re-
financing and reinvestment at unexpected times. The debtor's relinquishment of his right
to pay should be sufficient consideration. It was so held by the Appellate Division in the
Olmstead case which was reversed on this point by the Court of Appeals. The value
of a privilege to prepay is indicated by the frequency with which agreements giving this
right to a debtor provide that its exercise shall be conditioned on payment of additional
interest in compensation for the creditor's disadvantage thereby entailed. The Court of
Appeals rejected this argument as "fanciful" in the leading case of Kellogg v. Olmstead,
25 N. Y. 189 (1862), where it held that an express covenant not to prepay was insuffl-
cient to validate an extension agreement. The court relied on cases involving extensions
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Thus, an agreement by an owner to assign rents to the mortgagee, when
the mortgage itself provided for such an assignment, has been held in-
sufficient consideration for the mortgagee's agreement to forbear.45 And
a grantee's assumption of the mortgage, included in an extension agree-
ment, has been said to furnish no consideration if the grantee theretofore
became liable by his deed or prior agreement." Conversely, an agreement
to pay by one under no antecedent obligation has been declared valid.
Increasing the interest from a rate less than the legal one has been f.osund
insufficient in itself to constitute consideration since the creditor is en-
titled to the legal rate after maturity in any event.41 Similarly, a require-
ment by the mortgagee that interest be increased after maturity followed
by payment thereof by a grantee not liable therefore has been held in-
sufficient to render an extension enforceable. 4' The same result has fol-
lowed in cases in which a grantee, who had previously assumed the mort-
gage at; a lesser rate, affirmatively agreed to pay the increase." '
by creditors in consideration of debtor's agreements to continue payment of interest and,
in some cases, to pay part of the principal. These agreements had been held unenfurce-
able. The cases relied on seemed to have involved merely covenants of forbearance by
creditors and permitting the debtors to pay at will. They were deemed relevant, how-
ever, in Kellogg v. Olnstcad on the ground that a creditors covenant to extend inplics
a debtor's covenant not to prepay. The court, therefore, imolied conditions retroactively
in cases decided without reference thereto and thereon based a decision against logic, the
overw'helming weight of authority and commercial desirability. The curt observcd in
addition that inasmuch as the debtor -was to pay only the legal rate of interest, the "value
of the use of the money . . . fixed by law," there could be neither advantage nor dis-
advantage to debtor or creditor by the arrangement. By the same theory the damages
given for breach of contract to make a loan are nominal, but even there consequential
damages may be awarded. See Avalon Construction Corp. v. Kirch Holding Co., 25
N. Y. 137, 175 N. E. 651 (1931). Had the parties agreed on interest other than the
legal rate, the court's non sequitur would be more apparent. Furthermore, there is no
necessary correlation between the market value of money and the legal rate of interest.
45. See Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Romer Holding Co., 234 App. Div.
419, 255 N. Y. Supp. 254 (1st Dep't 1932).
46. See Neukirch v. McHugh, 165 App. Div. 406, 150 N. Y. Supp. 1032 (1st Dep't
1914).
47. See Jester v. Sterling, 25 Hun 344 (N. Y. 1881); cf. City Bank Farmers' Trust
Co. v. Slowmach Realty Corp., 238 App. Div. 524, 264 N. Y. Supp. 786 1Ist Dep't
1933), aff'd, 263 N. Y. 544, 189 N. E. 690 (1933). In Hunt v. Manville, 14S Misc. 57,
264 N. Y. Supp. 153 (Sup. Ct. 1932), a grantee had assumed the mortgage in his deed
from the mortgagor but his delivery of an interest-bearing note to the mortgagee for
interest and part of the principal was held to validate an extension.
48. This would probably not hold true in the case of mortgages occasionally used
which provide for a specified rate of interest untlil payment.
49. See N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Casey, 178 N. Y. 381, 70 N. E. 916 (1904); Rafel
v. Maurer, 101 Misc. 621, 167 N. Y. Supp. 941 (Sup. Ct. 1917).
50. See Neukirch v. McHugh, 165 App. Div. 406, 15 N. Y. Supp. 1032 (1st Dep't
1914).
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While the extension agreements discussed above contemplated post-
ponements of the debt for specified periods, a different result might follow
by estoppel if the duration of the extension were less specific. Thus, where
the mortgagee agreed to " 'ride' along for a time," the mortgagor was
held released on the ground that despite the absence of consideration the
mortgagee was precluded from enforcing his claim until service of a
notice to terminate and that until then a binding extension was created. 1
The mischief of the New York rule invalidating many extension agree-
ments was attacked in 1934 by a statute, 2 providing in effect that an
agreement to extend an obligation secured by real property should be valid
without consideration if in writing and signed by the parties. This statute
was promptly amended to authorize on the same terms a reduction in
interest." The statute, however, applied only to agreements "between a
creditor and obligee and a debtor, obligor, surety or guarantor," and would
seem to have excluded from its benefits a grantee not assuming the mort-
gage debt. 4 Subsequently the statute was broadened to provide that an
agreement to change or modify or discharge in whole or in part any
obligation "shall not be invalid because of the absence of consideration"
if in writing and signed by the party to be charged." The language
quoted has been criticised because of its negative phraseology and because
it revives "the metaphysical concept of value" ' and fails to provide, as
its predecessors did, that the agreements are valid without consideration.
The only reported decision concerning this statute assumed its adequacy."
Its ultimate construction will probably validate all extension and modifi-
cation agreements without consideration and thus carry out the obvious
purpose it was intended to effect despite its dubious language. The entire
question of consideration, however, must remain troublesome as long as
pre-statutory situations are possible subjects of litigation and the statutes
themselves require construction.
Reinstatement of mortgage as extension. Although New Yorkers have
had difficulty in effecting extension agreements when. such has been their
intention, it has been possible for them to stumble into a valid extension in-
51. See Syracuse Trust Co. v. First Trust & Dep. Co., 141 Misc. 603, 252 N. Y. Supp,
850 (Sup. Ct. 1931). See also Veerhoff v. Miller, 30 App. Div. 355, 51 N. Y. Supp. 1048
(2d Dep't 1898).
52. N. Y. Laws 1934, c. 143 (effective April 5, 1934).
53. N. Y. Laws 1934, c. 898 (effective Aug. 24, 1934).
54. But cf. Matter of R. A. Securities Holdings, 46 F. Supp. 254 (E. D. N. Y. 1942),
holding that mortgage participants may institute proceedings under Chapter X of the
Bankruptcy Act as creditors of an owner not liable on a mortgage.
55. N. Y. Laws 1936, c. 281 (effective April 6, 1936). See (1937) 23 VA. L. REV,
446; N. Y. LAW RwvMs. COMM. (1936) 81-374.
56. Note (1938) 48 YALE L. J. 149, 153, n. 21.
57. Greenwich Savings Bank v. Cabin Holding Co.. 176 Misc. 89, 26 N. Y. S. (2d)
791 (Sup. Ct. 1941). No appeal was taken in this case.
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advertently. Ost v. .31indlin,51 involving an action on a mortgage hond
against a guarantor, presents one such situation. In an earlier forecl osure
suit, brought against both the owner and guarantor, plaintiff had declared
the principal due pursuant to an acceleration clause in the mortgage.
Thereafter the owner cured defaults on which the foreclosure was based
and the mortgagee, owner and guarantor stipulated to discontinue the fore-
closure. 9 It was later held in the subsequent action that the discontinuance
of the foreclosure, by annulling the acceleration and reinstating the mort-
gage, constituted an extension releasing the guarantor despite the guar-
antor's consent to the discontinuance. The court relied on Kilpatric: v.
Gerwania Life Insurance Company ' for the proposition that a mortgagee
may not recall an acceleration without the mortgagor's consent. But the
Kilpatrick case merely held that acceleration permits a mortgagor to pay
the mortgage despite the mortgagee's effort to reinstate the mortgage for
the purpose of imposing upon an earlier payment such a condition as a
prepayment bonus. Inasmuch as the reinstatement in the Ost case restored
the original maturity, the guarantor was subjected to neither increased
risk nor a "new contract"-factors most often emphasized in the release
of a surety. Furthermore, the reinstatement removed the guarantor's
default as well as the owner's and reduced the guarantor's liability 1y
the payment accompanying the settlement. Nevertheless, there are at least
some dicta which would seem to support the Ost case.0'
58. 170 App. Div. 558, 156 N. Y. Supp. 695 (ist Dep't 1915), aff'd, 224 N. Y. tt,
121 N. E. 882 (1918).
59. The guarantor's participation in the stipulation of discontinuance was apparently
on his understanding that arrangements were being made for payment of the mortgage
without recourse to him. This only makes clearer the holding of the case that in the
absence of affirmative consent reinstatement to original maturity, without more, is an
"extension."
60. 183 N. Y. 163, 75 N. E. 1124 (1905).
61. Walsh v. Henel, 226 App. Div. 198, 235 N. Y. Supp. 34 (4th Dep't 1929) involvcd
facts similar to the Ost case except that the complaint in the prior foreclosure sought to
foreclose for the full principal, prior to maturity, without e-xpressly electing to acceler-
ate. The majority of the court ruled there was no reinstatement or release because the
mortgage had never become due. Apparently the mortgagee would have released his
obligor if he had drawn his foreclosure complaint properly. In Adler v. Berkowitz, 229
App. Div. 245, 240 N. Y. Supp. 597 (2d Dep't 1930), rev'd, 254 N. Y. 433, 173 N. E.
574 (1930), the mortgage provided it would become due 20 days after an interest default
though the bond provided for acceleration 30 days after default at the obligee's option.
The Appellate Division held the mortgagee's acceptance of interest from the grantee 26
days late a reinstatement releasing the mortgagor. The reversal was based on the rule
making a bond prevail over the mortgage in the event of repugnance between the two
and a holding that the mortgage had never matured. Neither court mentioned the rule
whereby an acceleration clause, being for the creditor's benefit, operates only at the
creditor's election. See Born v. Schrenkeisen, 110 N. Y. 55, 17 N. -a 339 (18M) ; Matter
of Steinvay's Estate, 174 Misc. 554, 21 N. Y. S. (2d) 31 (Surr. Ct. 1940). But cf. First
National Bank v. Marcher, 179 Misc. 258, 38 N. Y. S. (2d) 774 (Sup. Ct. 1942). In
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Receipt of interest in advance as extension. A second method of in-
advertent extension is possible when the mortgage is past due. Acceptance
of an interest installment before it is due creates a presumption that the
principal has been extended to the day when it will be fully earned. The
court in Germania Life Insurance Company v. Casey 02 indicated that this
presumption does not arise if the mortgagee "expressly reserves the
right at any time to return the surplus of interest or apply the same on
the principal," but actually held that prepayment of interest by one day
releases the mortgagor when the mortgagee fails to rebut the presumption.
Attorney Cardozo's successful advocacy in the Germania case did not
restrain him from pungent criticism of its doctrine seventeen years later."
Although it still represents the majority American view, 4 there are in-
dications that the Germania case is beginning to fare ill by the gentle art
of distinction. In New York Life Insurance Company v. Casey," pay-
ment of the January 1 interest installment on Friday, December 29, w's
held insufficient to presuppose an extension when New Year's day fell on
a Monday, preceded by a Sunday and a half holiday. In the recent case
of Kings County Trust Company v. Giovinco " the Court of Appeals
refused to apply the Germania doctrine where a bank received interest a
few days in advance but proved at the trial that it concluded no exten-
sions without prior submission to its president or vice-president and no
such submission had been made, In view of the fact that these cases
arise almost invariably from the almost mechanical practice in lending
institutions of mailing interest reminders in advance, and an occasional
overprompt response, the Giovinco case removes much of the sting of
the doctrine without, however, ending the wasteful litigation it makes
possible.
Types of agreements constituting release
General.7 While extension agreements are the most frequent type of
contracts releasing a mortgagor, any modification will effect this result.
Federal Land Bank v. Shoemaker, 147 Misc. 308, 263 N. Y. Supp. 653 (County Ct. 1933),
the reinstatement was held as not a release because the mortgagor had made the settle-
ment payment.
62. 98 App. Div. 88, 90 N. Y. Supp. 418 (1st Dep't 1904), aff'd without opinion, 184
N. Y. 554, 76 N. E. 1095 (1906).
63. CARDOZo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921) 152.
64. See Tuttle v. Metropolitan Savings Bank, N. Y. L. J., Nov. 6, 1941, p. 1398,
col. 1 (Sup. Ct.) ; East Side Savings Bank v. Scanlon, 146 Misc. 695, 262 N. Y. Supp.
790 (Sup. Ct. 1933); Granirer, The Acceptance of Prepayment of Interest as Effecting
Extension of Debt, N. Y. L. J., Dec. 5, 1939, p. 1962, col. 1, Dec. 6, 1939, p. 1984, col. 1;
(1927) 40 HARv. L. REv. 789; Note (1929) 59 A. L. R. 988.
65. 178 N. Y. 381, 70 N. E. 916 (1904).
66. 266 N. Y. 137, 194 N. E. 60 (1934).
67. For effect on mortgagor's liability of acquisition of mortgage by subsequent
obligor or owner, see text infra at p. 794.
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Subordination of a mortgage to a new "' or increased 69 prior lien, in-
creasing the amount of the mortgage itself,-, or consolidating the mort-
gage with an additional mortgage 7 -all of which are in substance the
same--discharge the mortgagor. Other modifications with the same effect
include: changing interest periods from semi-annual to quarter-annual ;-
abrogating a provision for the release of parcels from the mortgage ,1
payment of scheduled prices ," and permitting a sale of the premises in
partition free and dear of the mortgage.4
The New York Court of Appeals has repeatedly said that if a nit rtgag
is modified there will be no inquiry as to whether the mortgagor has been
damaged and that the extent of the injury is immaterial.7 But the word
"modification" has become a word of art. A release of part of the murt-
gagee's security releases the mortgagor only to the extent of the value
of the released security. 6 And even a valid extension of time of payment
of part of the principal constitutes a release only of the installment sts
extended.7  The mortgagor is not released by the mortgagee's receipt uf
68. See Rosenfeld v. Levine, 249 App. Div. 142, 291 N. Y. Supp. 474 (1st Dep't
1936).
69. See Union Bank v. Rubinstein, 78 Misc. 461, 138 N. Y. Supp. 644 (Sup. Ct. 1912),
aff'd, 160 App. Div. 919, 145 N. Y. Supp. 1 (1st Dep't 1914), 216 X. Y. 76G, 111 X. E.
1101 (1916); McDonough v. Mancuso, 234 App. Div. 161, 254 N. Y. Supp. 377 (3d
Dep't 1931).
70. See Central Savings Bank v. Ritchey Realky Corp., 239 App. Div. 6S9, 263 X. Y.
Supp. 700 (1st Dep't 1934).
71. See Toner v. Ehrgott, 226 App. Div. 244, 235 N. Y. Supp. 17 (1st Dep't 1929).
72. See Greenwich Savings Bank v. Cabin Holding Corp., 176 Misc. S9, 26 X. Y. S.
(2d) 791 (Sup. Ct. 1941). But see East N. Y. Savings Bank v. Morgenstern, N. Y.
L. J., June 1, 1933, p. 3297, col. 5 (Sup. Ct.) (wvant of consideration).
73. See Paine v. Jones, 76 N. Y. 274 (1879).
74. See Laird v. Wittkowski, 67 App. Div. 476, 73 X. Y. Supp. 1115 (1st Dep't
1902).
75. See Becker v. Faber, 280 N. Y. 146, 149, 19 N. E. (2d) 997, 999, 121 A. L. R.
1010, 1014 (1939) ; Murray v. Marshall, 94 N. Y. 611, 614 (1884) ; Calv.o v. Davies, 73
N. Y. 211, 216 (1878).
76. See Jackson v. Pescia, 124 N. Y. Supp. 735 (Sup. Ct. 1909), aff'd, 139 App. Div.
937, 124 N. Y. Supp. 1118 (2d Dep't 1910) ; McRae v. Pope, 311 Mass. 50U, 42 X. E.
(2d) 261 (1942) ; R ESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 146; 4 WImuaswo.. op. cit. Supra
note 14, §§ 1232,1234; Spziice., SURETYSHip (1913) §§245-4I6. See alsi Antisdel v. Wil-
liamson, 165 N. "1. 372, 376, 59 N. E. 207, 208 (1901). But cf. Farmers' & Merchants'
State Bank v. Tasche, 53 S. D. 603, 222 N. W. 139 (1928), (1929) 42 H.%nv. L REv. 712.
77. See Becker v. Faber, 280 N. Y. 146, 19 N. E. (2d) 997, 121 A. L R. 1010, 1014
(1939) ; Cohn v. Spitzer, 145 App. Div. 104, 129 N. Y. Supp. 104 (4th Dep't 1911),aff'd on
opizions below, 207 N. Y. 738, 101 N. E. 1098 (1913) ; Federal Land Bank v. Sh,)emaker,
147 Misc. 308, 263 N. Y. Supp. 653 (Sup. Ct. 1933); 4 WN.LISTON, op. cit. supra nte 14,
§ 1222. See also Katz v. Leblang, 243 App. Div. 421,425-26,277 N. Y. Supp. 850, 855 (l-t
Dep't 1935), 35 COL. L. REv. 620.
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additional security without further stipulation on his part ' or by the
compromise or reduction of past due interest. 0 The Court of Appeals,
while adhering to the traditional formula, recently held that an enforceable
agreement for reduction of interest in futuro is not a "modification." 80
No passive act of a mortgagee will constitute a modification."' The mort-
gagee is under no compulsion to enforce his rights with diligence,8" and
an indulgence shown to a grantee or a delay to foreclose is no defense
to a mortgagor 83 despite the accumulation of back interest and taxes
thereby added to the latter's liability.84
Conveyance of Mortgaged Premises to Mortgagee. A conveyance to
the mortgagee generally discharges the mortgage debt.8" But there is
no unanimity even within New York to this effect. A conveyance with full
warranties has been held a release,8 6 and a mere conveyance has been held
to presume as much."' A release in these circumstances includes the dis-
charge of an additional mortgage held as collateral security 88 even if
the mortgagee intended to avoid merger of the principal mortgage.89
78. See Bangs v. Strong, 10 Paige 11, 16 (N. Y. Ch. 1842), aff'd, 7 Hill 250 (N. Y.
Ct. Err. 1843) ; Union Trust Co. v. Toal, 28 N. Y. S. (2d) 956 (Sup. Ct. 1941); STEARNS,
op. cit. supra note 16, § 96.
79. See Merritt v. Youmans, 21 App. Div. 256, 47 N. Y. Supp. 664 (2d Dep't 1897)
Albany Exchange Savings Bank v. Winne, 168 Misc. 853, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 699 (Sup. Ct.
1938).
80. See Becker v. Faber, 280 N. Y. 146, 19 N. E. (2d) 997, 121 A. L. R. 1010, 1014
(1939).
81. See Westchester Mortgage Co. v. McIntire, 174 App. Div. 525, 161 N. Y. Supp,
384 (2d Dep't 1916) ; SPENCER, SURETYSHlP (1913) §§ 247-48.
82. See Marshall v. Davies, 78 N. Y. 414, 421'-22 (1879) ; Wiener v. Boehm, 126 App.
Div. 703, 111 N. Y. Supp. 126 (1st Dep't 1908). See also text infra at p. 798,
83. See Olmstead v. Latimer, 9 App. Div. 163, 168, 41 N. Y. Supp. 44, 48 (2d Dep't
1896), modified on other grozds, 158 N. Y. 313, 53 N. E. 5, 43 L. R. A. 685 (1899);
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Davies, 12 Jones & S. 172, 188 (N. Y. Super. Ct. 1878) ; Hoff-
man v. Piccone, 137 Misc. 537, 538, 242 N. Y. Supp. 707, 709 (N. Y. City Cts. 1930).
84. See Union Bank v. Rubinstein, 78 Misc. 461, 138 N. Y. Supp. 644, aff'd, 160 App,
Div. 919, 145 N. Y. Supp. 1 (1st Dep't 1914), 216 N. Y. 766, 111 N. E. 1101 (1916).
85. See 2 JoNEs, op. cit. supra note 8, §§ 912, 1213; Note (1935) 95 A. L. R.
89 (1935). There is no merger, however, unless the same person is seized of the entira
property and the whole debt. No merger occurs, therefore, where a mortgagee acquires
an undivided part interest in the fee or a tenant in common acquires the mortgage. Clark
v. Rowell, 163 Misc. 777, 298 N. Y. Supp. 232 (County Ct. 1937) ; THOMAS, MORTOAGES
(3d ed. 1914) § 391.
86. See Burnett v. Denniston, 5 Johns. Ci. 35 (N. Y. 1821).
87. See Hull v. Cronk, 55 App. Div. 83, 67 N. Y. Supp. 54 (2d Dep't 1900), dismissed,
166 N. Y. 606, 59 N. E. 1123 (1901).
88. See McGiven v. Wheelock, 7 Barb. Ch. 22 (N. Y. 1849) ; Wheelwright v. Loomer,
4 Edw. Ch. 232 (N. Y. 1843).
89. See Loomer v. Wheelwright, 3 Sandf. Ch. 135 (N. Y. 1845).
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On the other hand, there is authority making a conveyance to the
mortgagee a release only to the extent of the value of the premises-
which must be established by the mortgagor."" Two cases hold that a
conveyance subject to the mortgage makes the land "primarily liable" and
requires the mortgagee to forclose and credit the mortgagor with the value
of the premises before maintaining an action for the debt.0' Preservation
of the mortgage may be logically attributed to the mortgagee's desire
to protect his title to the fee; hence, preservation of the mortgage alone
ought not to imply reservation of rights on the bond, particularly where
the conveyance is from a person who is liable for the mortgage debt and
presumably expects to be released.
Consent of Mortgagor to Modification
Stray dicta may indicate that a modification must be without the knowl-
edge or consent of the mortgagor in order to release his liability.' But
it is clear that neither knowledge nor failure to protest will preserve his
obligation."' Nor is the mortgagor bound by the conduct of his attorney
acting beyond the scope of his retainer. 4 But actual participation by the
mortgagor in procuring the modification is generally deemed a consent
regardless of the particular capacity in which the mortgagor acts,0a unless
90. See Spencer v. Harford, 4 Wend. 381 (N. Y. 1830); cf. Harrison v. Hall, 239
N. Y. 51, 145 N. E. 737 (1924) (chattel mortgage). The Spencer case maies the con-
veyance the equivalent of a foreclosure and seems to be an application of the doubtful
ruling by Kent in Dunkley v. Van Buren, 3 Johns. Ci. 330 (N. Y. 1818), that foreclos-
ure is an action solely in rein. See Friedman, The Enforcement of Personal Liabilik, ol
Mortgage Debts ia Nero York (1942) 51 YALE L. J. 382-13, 410.
91. See Eagan v. Engeman, 125 App. Div. 743, 110 N. Y. Supp. 3t J (Ist Dep't
1908) ; Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Roslyn Estate, Inc., 266 App. Div. 244, 42
N. Y. S. (2d) 130 (2d Dep't 1943). See also Vanderkemp v. Shelton, 11 Paige -3, 34 (X.Y.
Ch. 1844). But cf. Railroad Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 135 F. (2d)
290 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943), which, in fixing the amount of deed stamps required, holds in
effect that a conveyance to a mortgagee, expressly subject to the mortgage, cancels the
debt.
92. See, e.g., N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Casey, 178 N. Y. 381, 387, 70 N. E. 916, 917
(1904) ; Hyde v. Miller, 45 App. Div. 396, 400, 60 N. Y. Supp. 974, 977 (4th Dep't 1899),
aff'd, 168 N. Y. 590, 60 N. E. 1113 (1901).
93. See McDonough v. 'Mancuso, 234 App. Div. 161, 254 N. Y. Supp. 377 (3d Dep't
1931) ; Grace v. Wilson, 139 Misc. 757, 250 N. Y. Supp. 212 (Sup. CL 1931) ; S7A-M.s,
op. cit. supra note 16, § 94.
94. See Rosenfeld v. Levine, 249 App. Div. 142,291 N. Y. Supp. 474 (1st Dep't 1936);
Magnus Beck Brewing Co. v. Setel, 130 Misc. 705, 225 N. Y. Supp. 41 ( Sup. Ct. 19-7).
95. That is, where he is personally liable as mortgagor and executes an agreement as
officer of the corporate owner or consents to the agreement as holder of a second mort-
gage. See M. H. Metal Products Corp. v. April, 251 N. Y. 146, 167 N. E. 201 (1929) ;
National Radiator Co. v. Hull, 79 App. Div. 109, 79 N. Y. Supp. 519 (2d Dep't 1903) ;
Pinchot v. Roskam, 123 Misc. 253, 204 N. Y. Supp. 782 (Sup. Ct. 1924) ; East X. Y.
Savings Bank v. 'Morgenstern, N. Y. L. J., June 1, 1933, p. 3297, col. 5 (Sup. Ct.). See
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he expressly disclaims a continuance of liability " or the modification
made exceeds the scope of the consent. 7  A mortgagor may consent in
advance to future modifications by inclusion of a survival clause in the
mortgage or other instrument agreeing that his liability will not be dis-
charged by subsequent agreements. 8  But such clauses are construed
strictly against the mortgagee 99 and do not prevent a discharge of liability
where the modification exceeds the scope of the consent.' And they do
not prevent the running of the Statute of Limitations in favor of the mort-
gagor. 1' A mortgagor's consent to a modification may be by parol.1°'
He may ratify a modification, without new consideration and reinstate
his liability, provided he knows the modification releases his original
liability.'0 3
also cases cited in Industrial Container Co. v. Slobodkin. N. Y. L. J., Nov. 15, 1940, p.
1571, col. 1 (N. Y. City Cts.).
96. See Irving Trust Co. v. Hutchinson Holding Corp., 241 App. Div. 107, 270 N.
Y. Supp. 684 (1st Dep't 1934).
97. See Schuck v. Kings Realty Co., 260 App. Div. 1021, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 764, aft'd,
285 N. Y. 750, 34 N. E. (2d) 907 (1941).
98. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Stimpson, 28 App. Div. 544, 51 N. Y. Supp.
226 (2d Dep't 1898); Kohn v. Beggi, 147 Misc. 701, 264 N. Y. Supp. 274 (Sup. Ct.
1933) ; Notes (1935) 94 A. L. R. 1447, (1938) 117 A. L. R. 964. There may be a tax
disadvantage in survival clauses in that they make an extension with an individual owner
of a mortgage made by a corporation, a renewal of a corporate obligation and thus sub-
ject to federal stamp tax.
99. See Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Rothschild, 160 N. Y. Supp. 164 (Sup. Ct. 1916),
modified on other grounds, 177 App. Div. 883, 163 N. Y. Supp. 1124 (1st Dep't 1916),
226 N. Y. 599, 123 N. E. 880 (1919) (grantee's agreement to "comply" with the terms
of the mortgage did not subject him to a survival clause included in the original mort-
gage) ; Irving Trust Co. v. Hutchinson Holding Co., 241 App. Div. 107, 270 N. Y. Supp.
684 (1st Dep't 1934) (survival clause in collateral bond respecting further agreements
between mortgagee and subsequent owners held inapplicable to agreement with the orig-
inal owner) ; Excelsior Savings Bank v. Cohen, 176 App. Div. 740, 1'63 N. Y. Supp. 1017
(1st Dep't 1917), aff'd, 228 N. Y. 570, 127 N. E. 912 (1920) (mortgagor's liability lim-
ited to original interest though rate increased by subsequent agreement).
100. Survival clauses authorizing extension agreements have been insufficient to pre-
vent discharge of liability when the extension agreements included additional clauses gen-
erally common to extension agreements. Schuck v. Kings Realty Co., 260 App. Div.
1021, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 764 (2d Dep't 1940), aff'd, 285 N. Y. 750, 34 N. E. (2d) 907
(1941) ; Matter of Raisler, N. Y. L. J., June 6, 1939, p. 2606, col. 7 (Surr. Ct.) ; and cl.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Aeon Realty Co., N. Y. L. J., Jan. 17, 1933, p. 323, col. 4
(Sup. Ct.) (mortgagor released where principal of mortgage increased after reduction).
101. See Smith v. Wagner, 106 Misc. 170, 174 N. Y. Supp. 205 (Sup. Ct. 1919).
102. 4 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 14, § 1223.
103. See Carpenter v. Hogan, N. Y. L. J., July 31, 1943, p. 221, col. 1. (Sup. Ct.),
which collects the authorities; 4 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 14, § 1223; 1 BRANDr,
SURETYsrIP AND GUARANTY (3d ed. 1905) § 381; PINGREY, SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY
(2d ed. 1913) § 101; 50 C. J. 193, 194, 254; cf. Schwartz v. American Surety Co., 231
Mass. 490, 121 N. E. 424 (1919).
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Reservation of Rights against Mortgagor and Extension on Condition
A mortgagee may probably dispense with his mortgagor's consent to
an extension agreement without loss of the latter's liability by reservation
of his rights against the mortgagor in accordance with the general rule
that a creditor may deal with the principal and reserve his rights against
the surety.104  Reservation of creditor's rights as applied to mortgage
extensions leaves the mortgagor an unconditional right to pay the mort-
gage after the original maturity and enforce any right of subrogation
or reimbursement in disregard of the extension created between the mort-
gagee and grantee. The extension is, therefore, without effect on either
the mortgagor's rights or liability.
In order to thus maintain the status quo the reservation must be un-
ambiguous.' The agreement in Calvo v. Davies " provided that the
bond and mortgage "should remain in every other respect unaffected
by said agreement." In ilet.zger v. Nova Realty Coinpan3V,107 the agree-
ment stated, "Nothing herein contained shall impair the security now held
for the debt or any condition. . . in said bond and mortgage.. . ." In
both cases the Court of Appeals held the language quoted insufficient to
effect a reservation, but did not foreclose the possibility that the rule ap-
plies in mortgage situations.108
Apart from the difficulties of strict construction the practical objection
to reservation, and undoubtedly the reason for its rarity in mortgage
extensions, is that it does not give the grantee an unconditional extension
but possibly a mere substitution of creditors.0 9 Despite the abstract
logic of the doctrine of reservation of rights against the mortgagor, it
tends to remove, at least for the duration of the extension, an induce-
104. See Palmer v. Purdy, 3 N. Y. 144 (1880); Note (1941) 50 Y.LE L. J. 1485;
RESTATEMENT, SECURITY (1941) § 122. See also Rr.PORT OF N. Y. Lvw Rms. Coz.m.
(1937) 907-10; STEARNS, op. cit. supra note 16, § 92.
105. See Morgan v. Smith, 70 N. Y. 537, 546 (1877).
106. 73 N. Y. 211, 217 (1878).
107. 214 N. Y. 26, 29-30, 107 N. E. 1027, 1028 (1915) ; cf. Laird v. Wittkowski, 67
App. Div. 476, 73 N. Y. Supp. 1115 (1st Dep't 1902).
10. Gordon v. Maurno Realty Co., N. Y. L. J., Jan. 31, 1940, p. 493, col. 4 (Sup. Ct.),
is apparently the only mortgage case directly in point in New: York. There, an extension
agreement was made expressly subject and subordinate to, and with reservation of, all
rights of the mortgagor. The reservation was upheld and summary judgment given the
mortgagee against the mortgagor. See Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Bainbridge Building Co.,
N. Y. L. J., July 10, 1943, p. 73, col. 5 (Sup. Ct.) ; cf. Union Trust Co. v. Toal, 23 N. Y.
S. (2d) 956 (Sup. Ct. 1941); and the concurring opinion in Lobee v. Williams, 226
App. Div. 211, 216, 234 N. Y. Supp. 649, 654 (4th Dep't 1929).
109. Professor Glenn argues that reservation is more likely to increase a surety's risk
in mortgage extensions than in commercial suretyship with short maturities. See Glenn,
Purchasing Subject to Mortgage. Second Phase, Mortgagee's Rights Against Assuming
Grantee (1942) 28 VA. L. REv. 445, 461-62.
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ment to pay by the person enjoying the beneficial interest in the premises
and having an affirmative interest in liquidating the mortgage lien.
An extension with reservation of rights against the surety has at times
been regarded as an extension subject to the consent of the surety 110
in which event the extension is nullified if the surety refuses."' But this is
not an extension with a reservation-in fact, the two are conceptually re-
pugnant. An extension conditioned on consent is a nullity without con-
sent, while an extension with a reservation can be affected without the
surety's knowledge or consent." 2 Any owner has sufficient interest to join
with the mortgagee in an effective extension agreement 1 and thereby
fund the mortgage debt. If the owner and mortgagee are agreeable to an
extension with reservation of the surety's rights, with its possible conse-
quences, there is no reason why such an agreement should be subject to
subsequent disruption by either on the fictitious assumption that the
parties intended an extension on condition. This result may be drastic; a
mortgagee may thereby be compelled, after a change of position, to refund
a substantial amortization paid and accepted in good faith in connection
with the abortive extension 4
MORTGAGOR'S RIGHT OF REIMBURSEMENT
A mortgagor who has conveyed to an assuming grantee cannot recover
judgment for the mortgage debt against his gantee merely because of
maturity of the mortgage."5 If the mortgagor were to receive such pay-
110. See Calvo v. Davies, 73 N. Y. 211, 217 (1878). See also 4 WiLLISgroN, op. cit.
supra note 14, § 1230, criticising the comparison as artificial.
111. See Bangs & Alcott v. Strong, 10 Paige 11, 18 (N. Y. Ch. 1842), aff'd, 7 Hill
250 (N. Y. Ct. Errors 1843); Note L. R. A. 1915C 831.
112. See REPORT oF N. Y. LAW REvis. CoMm. (1937) 908.
113. See Veerhoff v. Miller, 30 App. Div. 355, 358, 51 N. Y. Supp. 1048, 1050 (2d
Dep't 1898). See also Schwartz v. Smith, 143 App. Div. 297, 300, 128 N. Y. Supp. 1, 3
(1st Dep't 1911), aff'd, 207 N. Y. 714, 101 N. E. 1121 (1913).
114. Compare Mehlhop v. Central Union Trust Co., 235 N. Y. 102, 138 N. E. 751
(1923), where an owner, not liable on a mortgage, had paid the mortgagee $3,000 In
reduction of the mortgage in connection with a proposed extension which, because of it
dispute, was never consummated. Subsequently, the mortgagee foreclosed and allowed
credit on the mortgage debt for this payment. Thereafter, the owner recovered judg-
ment for the $3,000 on ground of failure of consideration.
115. See Ayers v. Dixon, 78 N. Y. 318 (1879). There is conflict among the states,
which may not have been ultimately resolved in New York, respecting the mortgagor's
right, before paying the mortgagee, to recover the amount of the mortgage debt from
an assuming grantee. See Rawson's Adm'x v. Copland, 2 Sandf. Ch. 251 (N. Y. 1844),
aff'd, 3 Barb. Ch. 1166 (N. Y. 1848); Adams v. Symon, 22 Abb. N. C. 469, 6 N. Y.
Supp. 652 (Sup. Ct. 1889) ; McRae v. Pope, 311 Mass. 500, 42 N. E. (2d) 261 (1942) ;
Notes (1922) 21 A. L. R. 504, 507 et seq., (1932) 76 A. L. R. 1191, 1194 el seq., (1935)
97 A. L. R. 1076, 1077. Besides the reason mentioned in the text, the mortgagor ought
not be permitted to disrupt an understanding between mortgagee and grantee that the
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ment, the grantee's land would still be encumbered by the mortgage and
yet he would have no assurance that the mortgagee's claim would be liqui-
dated. If the mortgagor pays, he may recover over against his assuming
grantee or any other owner in a chain of assumptions."' But this is about
all that is settled on the subject.
In three cases the mortgagor paid the mortgagee, sued the grantee fur
reimbursement, and then discovered that the mortgagee had released the
grantee before the mortgagor paid the mortgage. While all three cases
agree that the stipulations between mortgagee and grantee would have
released the mortgagor had the point been timely raised, they disagree
with respect to the mortgagor's right over after paying the murtgagee
under these circumstances. In Hyde v. Miller "I the court held that the
agreement between mortgagee and grantee could not affect the mortgagor
if unknown to him. But in Knoblock z,. Zschwetske 118 the court ruled
that when the mortgagor failed to see the stipulation of release in the
foreclosure record, he paid the mortgagee at his peril. In Lobee v. IT'i!-
liams".9 it was indicated that the mortgagor would recover if, but only if,
his payment to the mortgagee were made in ignorance of the grantee's
release.
The right of reimbursement has also arisen between a mortgagee and
a grantee who took the property subject to the mortgage but subsequently
assumed by agreement between grantee and mortgagee. When mortgagors
have claimed such agreements released them completely under Calvo v.
Davies, it has been held that they were not "sureties," but Murray v,.
Marshall has been applied to release the mortgagors to the extent of the
value of the property.'= ° The theory of the cases is that no privity exists
between mortgagor and grantee by reason of an agreement between grantee
mortgage remain open, unless he brings a bill for exoneration or proceeds under Pain
v. Packard, 13 Johns. 174 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1816). See text at p. 795 infra.
116. Comstock v. Drohan, 71 N. Y. 9 (1877); Taintor v. Hemmingway, IS Hun 4.53
(3d Dep't N. Y. 1879), aff'd, 83 N. Y. 610 (1880); Notes (1922) 21 A. L. R. 507, 520,
(1932) 76 A. L. R. 1191, 1196; see note 13 sutpra. But see Keller v. Lee, 6 App. Div.
184, 72 N. Y. Supp. 948 (4th Dep't 1901).
The foreclosure of a blanket mortgage entitles any owner of part of the tract to
recovery for the value of his parcel' against a purchaser of another part who assumed
the entire mortgage. Russell v. Pistor, 7 N. Y. 171 (1852). See Friedman, supra note
5, at 248, 249.
117. 45 App. Div. 396, 60 N. Y. Supp. 974 (4th Dep't 1899), aff'd -uithorts opinion,
168 N. Y. 590, 60 N. E. 1113 (1901).
118. 21 Jones & Sp. 391 (N. Y. 1886). In both the Hydc and Knoblock, cases the
grantees' release was by stipulation filed in the foreclosure action.
119. 226 App. Div. 211, 234 N. Y. Supp. 649 (4th Dep't 1929). The trial court %%as
held in error in holding that the grantee's liability over to the mortgagor was res ad-
judicata by reason of the earlier foreclosure. It accordingly reversed a judgment for the
plaintiff and granted a new trial.
120. See text at pp. 775, 779 supra.
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and mortgagee. The same rationale is applied to reimbursement cases
based on the same situation. Accordingly, a grantee who assumed the
mortgage by agreement with the mortgagee, and paid a deficiency judg-
ment, cannot recover over against the mortgagor.' 2 ' And, conversely, it
seems that a mortgagor who has paid a deficiency judgment cannot re-
cover over against such a grantee. 122 The result leaves the ultimate liability
for the mortgage debt entirely to the mortgagee's caprice. Query, as to
the incidence of liability between mortgagor and grantee in this situation
if the mortgagee should recover judgment against both in the same action.
Although the Court of Appeals has never been faced with this situation,
two cases are fairly comparable. In Commercial Casualty Insurance
Company v. Roman 123 the mortgagor had conveyed the premises subject
to the mortgage. The mortgagee gave an extension to a subsequent owner
in consideration of a collateral bond, of the owner and a surety company,
121. See Winslow v. Stoothoff, 104 App. Div. 28, 93 N. Y. Supp. 335 (2d Dep't
1905) ; cf. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hall, 31 App. Div. 574, 52 N. Y. Supp. 404 (2d Dep't
1898), aff'd, 166 N. Y. 595, 59 N. E. 1127 (1901).
122. In Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Bainbridge Building Co., N. Y. L. J., July 31, 1942,
p. 243, col. 6 (Sup. Ct.), a mortgagor, who had agreed to remain liable despite mortgage
modifications between the mortgagee and subsequent owners, conveyed the property sub-
ject to the mortgage. Thereafter, the grantee, in an agreement with the mortgagee, as-
sumed the mortgage and, simultaneously, gave the mortgagee a collateral bond of H.
After default the mortgagee agreed, in consideration of a $12,000 payment, not to seek
a deficiency judgment against either the grantee or H. Thereafter the mortgagee fore-
closed and sought a deficiency judgment against the mortgagor alone. The mortgagor
moved to interplead H ar, a party defendant liable over to the mortgagor. This motion was
denied with the following opinion:
"At the time the moving defendant sold the mortgaged property to the defendant
Bainbridge Building Corporation the latter did not assume the mortgages. The execu-
tion by Bainbridge Building Corporation some time thereafter of an extension agree-
ment with the plaintiff, to which the moving defendant was not a party, did not have
the effect, as between the defendant and Bainbridge Building Corporation, of making
the former a mere surety to the mortgagee. . . . It follows that the moving defendant
has failed to show that the defendant whom it proposes to bring into the action will be
liable over it in the event of a recovery by the plaintiff. The motion to bring in an addi-
tional defendant is accordingly denied." Ibid.
On motion for reargument the court adhered to its original determination and wrote
a similar opinion. See N. Y. L. J., Oct. 23, 1942, p. 1155, col. 4, aff'd without opinion, 265
App. Div. 996, 39 N. Y. S. (2d) 996 (1st Dep't 1943). Leave to appeal was denied
in 265 App. Div. 1052, 41 N. Y. S. (2d) 192 (1st Dep't 1943). On the subsequent trial
the mortgagor was held liable for any deficiency judgment despite its claim of release
by reason of the mortgagee's covenant to seek no deficiency judgment against either the
grantee or H. See N. Y. L. J., July 10, 1943, p. 73, col. S (Sup. Ct.). In a companion
action brought by the mortgagor against H, the mortgagor sought a determination that
H would be liable to the mortgagor for any sum payable by the latter to the mortgagee.
The mortgagor's complaint was dismissed. See 37 West 57th Street Co. v. Harst, N. Y.
L. J., July 10, 1943, p. 73, col. 7 (Sup. Ct.).
123. 269 N. Y. 451, 199 N. E. 658 (1936).
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conditioned on payment of the mortgage. When the premises were sid1
under a prior lien, the surety company paid the mortgage and sued the
mortgagor. The mortgagor claimed a release by reason of the extensi in
agreement. The case was argued and decided on the theory that Murray
v. Marshall governed and that, therefore, the mortgagor was liable fhor
the mortgage debt less the value of the property at the time of the ex-
tension. On this basis the surety company recovered judgmient against
the mortgagor. If the position of the surety company, which was derived
from the grantee, is the same as that of the grantee, the result makes the
mortgagor's liability primary as against the grantee and, in effect, givtes
the grantee a cause of action against the mortgagor.
In Katg v. Alendelsohn ", 24 decided three years before the Roman case,
an owner sold his property and received a purchase money mortgage in
part payment. He assigned the mortgage and guaranteed its payment.
The grantee resold the premises subject to the mortgage which the second
grantee did not assume. The assignee of the mortgage instituted fo-Ire-
closure and procured a receiver of the rents. The then owner had the
receiver discharged by filing a bond, of herself and a surety co-4mpany,
conditioned upon payment of any judgment recovered in the foreclosure.
A deficiency judgment was recovered against the mortgagee-guarantor,
which was paid by the surety company taking an assignment to vnfirce
the judgment against the mortgagee. The Court of Appeals canceled the
judgment against the mortgagee, noting that the surety company had
guaranteed payment of a deficiency judgment at the behest of a subse-
quent owner who thereby became revested with rents which would other-
wise have been credited against the mortgagee-guarantor's liability. 12
But "the principle of law governing the determination of this case,"
wrote the court, is that one becoming a surety for a debt during an action
against the principal is not a co-surety and not entitled to contribution."-
If the position of the mortgagee-guarantor in the Katz case be viewed
as that of a mortgagor, which in effect he was, the Court of Appeals may
be deemed to have held that an assuming grantee may nut, after payment.
recover over against the mortgagor. The theory upon which the decision
was predicated, however, was a narrow point of suretyship law un-
connected with mortgages.
The general approach in all these cases seems highly questionable. The
majority opinion in the Katz case states, in passing, that an extension of
the right of subrogation against the mortgagee-guarantor would give
124. 260 N. Y. 434, 184 N. E. 45 (1933), 46 -Mthv. L. RIEv. 1344; (1933) 10 N. Y. U.
L. Q. REv. 546.
125. The court also noted the absence of evidence of the amvunt uf such rents.
126. The dissenting judge argued that the mortgagee-guarantor should be held liable
but with a credit for the rents freed by the surety company bond. 260 N. Y. 434, 441,
184 N. E. 45, 47 (1933).
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the later owner a right she would not have if she had paid the mortgage
before the foreclosure and would charge the mortgagee with an obligation
she had assumed.12 But this approach was not developed in the opinion
and did not govern the determination of either this or the later Roman
case. It is submitted, however, that this is the proper approach to the
question. When a purchaser of mortgaged property takes the premises
subject to a mortgage, his purchase price is thereby reduced. 2 If he
pays the mortgage debt during his ownership, the liability of the mort-
gagor is thereby discharged whether the grantee assumed 129 the mort-
gage by deed or took subject thereto. 80 The grantee cannot avoid this
by taking an assignment in the name of a nominee.' In view of the
fact that the grantee enjoys the beneficial interest in the property and
its rents and profits, this result is eminently fair. On this basis it would
seem that payment of the debt in the Katz and Roman cases by either
the subsequent owners, their sureties, or anybody claiming through the
owners should have discharged the mortgagor or original guarantor with-
out more. And a grantee who assumes the debt by subsequent agreement
with the mortgagee, and thereafter pays a deficiency judgment, should
never be entitled to full reimbursement against a mortgagor despite lack
of privity between grantee and mortgagor. At most there should be con-
tribution between the two, for any co-debtor 182 or co-surety "8I is en-
127. 260 N. Y. 434, 438, 184 N. E. 45, 46 (1933).
128. See text at p. 773 supra.
129. See Matter of Browne, 35 Misc. 362, 71 N. Y. Supp. 1034 (Surr. Ct. 1901) ; 2
PomERoY, op. cit. supra note 8, § 797; 2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 44, at 2612, § 640.
See also Ayers v. Dixon, 78 N. Y. 318, 323 (1879) ; cf. text at p. 791 supra.
If a purchaser of part of a mortgaged tract assumes the entire debt and then aequire,
the mortgage, the remaining premises are thereby freed of the mortgage lien. Wilcox v.
Campbell, 35 Hun 254 (5th Dep't N. Y. 1885), aff'd, 106 N. Y. 325, 12 N. E. 823 (1887).
See Friedman, supra note 5, at 248-49.
130. See Lagrave v. Hellinger, 144 App. Div. 397, 129 N. Y. Supp. 291 (1st Dep't
1911), aff'd, 205 N. Y. 577, 98 N. E. 1106 (1912); Mathews v. Aikin, 1 N. Y. 595
(1848) ; Armstrong v. Purcell, 74 App. Div. 623, 78 N. Y. Supp. 36 (2d Dep't 1902),
2 JoNEs, op. cit. supra note 8; 2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 44 at 2666, § 646. But cl.
Southworth v. Scofield, 51 N. Y. 513 (1873) ; Bock v. Gallagher, 114 Mass. 28 (1873).
131. See Lagrave v. Hellinger, 144 App. Div. 397, 129 N. Y. Supp. 291 (1st Dep't
1911), aff'd, 205 N. Y. 577, 98 N. E. 1106 (1912) ; Mathews v. Aikin, 1 N. Y. 595 (1848).
Reassignment of a bond and mortgage, acquired by an assuming grantee, vests the as-
signee with no right to enforce the bond. Kellogg v. Ames, 41 N. Y. 259 (1869) ; Ely
v. McNight, 30 How. Pr. 97 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1864).
132. See Weed v. Calkins, 24 Hun 582 (3d Dep't N. Y. 1881); 3 TIFFANY, op. cit.
supra note 44, at 2665, § 646.
133. See Morgan v. Smith, 70 N. Y. 537 (1877); (1933) 10 N. Y. U. L. Q. R'v. 546.
Williston writes: "On principle, it would seem that whenever two persons, or one per-
son and the property of another, have come under an absolute liability without more, there
should be contribution regardless of the form of the undertaking, unless some contract
between them or equitable considerations require a different result." WILLIsTON, op. cit,
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titled to contribution from his co-obligor for the latter's share of the
debt. It is the writer's opinion that the owner last assuming should be
placed by his assumption under a full primary liability regardless Uf
whether his assumption was created by agreement with the mortgagor or
the mortgagee. The credit on his purchase price of the amount of the
mortgage, plus the benefits and strategic advantages of his fee owner-
ship, are ample warrant for this, particularly after he has personally
assumed the debt. A contrary rule exalts the technical concept of privity
and leads to results which cannot be justified practically. Furthermore,
if a grantee's assumption, by agreement with the mortgagor, is deemed
to radiate enough beneficial intention toward the mortgagee to make the
mortgagee a third-party beneficiary,' 3 ' a mortgagor may claim with equal
cogency that he is a third-party beneficiary of an assumption made be-
tween the grantee and mortgagee.
MORTGAGOR'S RIGHT OF EXONERATION; M1ORTGAGOR'S RIGHT TO SUE
The mortgagor cannot require the mortgagee to foreclose on maturity.
He may protect himself against enhancement of liability by paying thedebt, taking an assignment of the bond and mortgage and proceeding
against the land and an assuming grantee for indemnity. But even with-
out payment of the debt the mortgagor may prevent an increase of liabili-
ty. He may bring an action to compel an assuming grantee to discharge
the mortgage or, in the alternative, have the premises sold for this pur-
pose. This remedy of exoneration is well established.' Its use is in-
frequent, however, probably because of mortgagors' inertia when the
mortgage is adequately secured or reluctance to precipitate matters when
the security is more dubious.
The mortgagor may also protect himself against increase of liability
under the doctrine of Pain s. Packard,3  a rule of suretyship law adopted
in a minority of the states-in some, like New York, by the courts, and
in others by statute. When the doctrine applies, the creditor's failure tu
enforce payment of the debt releases the surety to the extent of the loss
thereafter sustained. The rule has been criticized, explained and qualified
supra note 14, at 364748, § 1277A. Whenever several sureties are "equally bound" a
right of contribution exists betwveen them regardless of the chronological order in which
the respective obligations were assumed. Newburger v. Lubell. 266 N. Y. 4, 193 X. E. 440
(1934) ; Yawger v. American Surety Co., 212 N. Y. 292, 106 N. E. 64 (1914).
134. See Friedman, supra note 5, at 235-36.
135. See Marsh v. Pike, 10 Paige 595 (N. Y. Ch. 1844); Rubens v. Prindle, 44 Barb.
C. 336 (N. Y. 1864) ; Marshall v. Davies, 78 N. Y. 414,421 (1879) ; Glenn, Purchasi.g
Subject to Mortgage. First Phase: .1fortgagor's Rights Against Grantee (1941) 27 VAA.
L R.v. 853, 868; but cf. Slauson v. Watkins, 86 N. Y. 597 (1881) (action does not lie
during pendency of foreclosure).
136. 13 Johns. 174 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1816).
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so extensively as to leave its precise limits in doubt.137 The chief ob-
jection to it is that it converts suretyship from an assurance of payment
to a source of additional litigation. Under Pain v. Packard the surety's
demand is ineffectual unless given after maturity 13s and clearly demands
the institution of an action against the principal .13  The rule was first
applied to a situation where the principal-surety relationship existed at
the inception of the obligation, and was justified on the basis of the pre-
sumed intention of the parties that payment be first sought from the
principal debtor. It was then extended to situations where the principal-
surety relationship was created between original debtors by their dealings
with each other, as in the case of a retiring partner. But it was not ap-
plied to collateral engagements made subsequent to the original obliga-
tion upon independent consideration as, for example, an assignment of
a mortgage with a guarantee of payment' ° Some recent cases, however,
have applied the doctrine to a mortgagor who conveyed to a non-assuming
grantee' and have been criticized for their inconsistency with the estab-
lished limitations. 142  Further, they make a substantial inroad, without
critical examination, upon the rule that the "primary liability" of the
land has no application to the mortgagee.1 43
CRITICISM OF SURETYSHIP RULES
Murray v. Marshall has been criticized on the ground that it imputes
to the mortgagor, a primary obligor, the status of a surety when there is
neither a "principal" debtor nor a request that the mortgagor become a
surety.144 True, the conventional suretyship triangle is not present but
similar logic might once have been urged against the creation of con-
137. For surveys of the rule of Pain v. Packard, see Comment (1928) 37 YALE L. J.
971 and L. R. A. 1918C 10. For qualifications of the rule, see More, Failure of Cred-
itor to- Sue Principal at Surety's Request (1929) 1 Rocicy MT. L. REv. 232.- See also
STARNs, op. cit. supra note 16, § 16; 4 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 14, § 1236.
138. The surety cannot require the creditor to accelerate the debt. Marks v. Folio,
177 Misc. 108, 29 N. Y. S. (2d) 1019 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Comment (1928) 37 YALE L. J.
971, 978.
139. For form of notice required, see Notes (1924) 30 A. L. R. 1285; (1911) 21 Ann.
Cas. 1367; and authorities cited supra note 137.
140. See Newcomb v. Hale, 90 N. Y. 326 (1882).
141. See cases collected in Union Trust Co. v. Rogers, 261 App. Div. 882, 25 N. Y.
S. (2d) 120 (4th Dep't 1941) ; Osborne v. Heyward, 40 App. Div. 78, 57 N. Y. Supp,
542 (2d Dep't 1899).
142. See (1935) 20 CoRN. L. Q. 249, criticising National Savings Bank v, Fermac,
241 App. Div. 204, 271 N. Y. Supp. 836 (3d Dep't 1934), aff'd, 266 N. Y. 443, 195 N. Z,
145 (1934).
143. See Kmetz v. DeRonde, 231 N. Y. 641, 132 N. E. 921 (1921); and compare
note 11 supra.
144. See Stevens, loc. cit. supra note 33. Professor Stevens' article advances other
and more cogent criticism.
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structive and resulting trusts. There is no requirement that a surety be
"requested" to act.1 45 Furthermore, the right of subrogation, and the
penalty for its irhpairment, appears in situations other than that of
conventional suretyship. Thus, if .4 owns land affected by a judgment
recovered against B, A has a right that other lands of B be sold first.
A also has a right, on payment of the judgment, to succeed to the rights
of the judgment creditor by way of subrogation. But A's rights do not
depend upon payment by him. If the judgment creditor releases a surety
for the judgment without A's consent, equity will discharge the judg-
ment lien from A's land.
40
Calo v. Davies and Murray v. Marshall can be justified only if a mort-
gagor who pays the debt finds that his remedy over against the land or
any person has been impaired by reason of an agreement made by the
mortgagee and a subsequent owner. These cases presuppose that a mort-
gagor is bound by such agreement.147 A Pennsylvania case ruled directly
to the contrary but a comment thereon states that "this has never been
adjudged." 14' In a Connecticut case a mortgagor sold part of the mort-
gaged premises to an assuming grantee. The grantee extended the mort-
gage with the mortgagee. The mortgagor paid the mortgage, sued the
grantee for reimbursement without awaiting expiration of the extension
and recovered judgment. 49 The court observed that continuous exten-
sions would expose the mortgagor to risk of diminution of the value of
the land sold and of his grantee's insolvency as well. It also observed
that extensions would prevent a sale, mortgage or improvement of the
mortgagor's remaining unsold land. Although not mentioned in the
opinion, it would seem that the grantee alone lacked capacity to modify
a mortgage on land only partly owned by him. In two New York cases
it was held in effect that guarantors of mortgages were liable for interest
at the original rate and not the increased rate effected by the extensitoin
agreements. z°o
It is not clear, therefore, how solid the logical foundation of the Cah'o
and Murray cases is. But it is the merits of the rules which have been
145. See Mathews v. Aikin, 1 N. Y. 595 (1848).
146. See Barnes v. Mott, 64 N. Y. 397 (1876).
147. See Metzger v. Nova Realty Co., 214 N. Y. 26, 30, 107 N. E. 1027, 1028 (1915);
Brockton Savings Bank v. Shapiro, 311 Mass. 695, 42 N. E. (2d) 826 ,1942).
148. See Joyce v. Hawtof, 135 Pa. Super. 30, 4 A. (2d) 599 (1939), 5 U. OF Psrr. L
REV. 286.
149. See Cacavalle v. Lombardi, 106 Conn. 339, 138 At. 155 (1927).
150. See Excelsior Savings Bank v. Cohen, 176 App. Div. 740, 163 N. Y. Supp.
1017 (1st Dep't 1917), aff'd, 228 N. Y. 570, 127 N. E. 912 (1920) ; Schwartz . Smith,
143 App. Div. 297, 128 N. Y. Supp. 1 (1st Dep't 1911), aft'd, 207 N. Y. 714, 101 N. E.
1121 (1913). In both cases the guarantors' liability, for diffcrent reasons, survived the
extension agreements. The decisions are questionable because, regardless of agreement,
the creditor was entitled to the legal rate of interest after maturity. See text msipra at
781.
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subjected to modern attack. The criticism is obviously justified when a
mortgagor is released by an extension made before or after maturity
regardless of any effort on his part to invoke the rerhedies presumed to
have been taken from him by the agreement.'' Cardozo has reduced to
absurdity the. "fictitious assumption that a surety, who has probably lain
awake at night for fear that payment may some day be demanded, has
in truth been smarting under the repressed desire to force an unwelcome
payment on a reluctant or capricious creditor. The extended period has
gone by; the surety has made no move, has not even troubled himself to
inquire; yet he is held to be released on the theory that were it not for
the extension, of which he knew nothing, and by which his conduct would
not have been controlled, he would have come forward voluntarily with
a tender of the debt." 102
Williston "03 points out that ordinarily a creditor's delay is no defense
to a surety 154 and that a surety, with his equitable remedies to compel
payment, ought not to expect any greater diligence of the creditor than
he himself shows. All critics agree that if the surety has in fact been
harmed, some relief should be given him, though there is no unanimity
on the extent or means of achieving this result. If at the time of the
extension the principal debtor is insolvent, any injury to the surety from
the extension is illusory. But, as Durfee suggests, it is both inconvenient
and unfair to make the surety prove the financial deterioration of the
principal, though this is his duty under Pain v. Packard, or to make a
release depend on the balance of injury and benefit of the extension
agreement or the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the creditor's
action.r'5 After a thoroughgoing investigation a New York law revisory
commission recently recommended a statutory change whereby a surety
would not be discharged by a change in the principal obligation except
to the extent to which the surety is prejudiced thereby.100 This proposal
was rejected, but it is difficult to disagree with its goal, based on Cardozo's
suggestion, of "placing this branch of the law upon a basis more con-
sistent with the realities of business experience and the moralities of
life." 157
151. See text supra at 780.
152. See C~anozo, op. cit. supra note 63, at 153-54. See also (1937) 4 U. op Cin. L.
REv. 469, 472.
153. See WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 14, § 1225.
154. See Glacius v. Fogel, 88 N. Y. 434 (1882); Newcomb v. Hale, 90 N. Y. 326
(1882) ; Kings County Trust Co. v. Derx, 237 App. Div. 548, 261 N. Y, Supp. 909 (2d
Dep't 1933). See also text supra at 786.
155. Durfee, Book Review (1932) 17 CORN. L. Q. 707.
156. REPORT OF N. Y. LAW Rmvs. Co.iu. (1937) 875 el seq. The proposed statute
was expressly inapplicable to retired partners and parties secondarily liable on negotiable
instruments.
157. CARDOZO, op. cit. supra note 63, at 155.
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